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Abstract 
This study presents the first semi-quantum private comparison (SQPC) protocol 
under an almost-dishonest third party. The proposed protocol allows two classical 
participants to compare their secret information without compromising it’s privacy. 
The security analyses indicate that the protocol is free from several well-known 
attacks. 
 
Keywords: Semi-quantum private comparison; almost-dishonest third-party; outsider 
attack; insider attack. 
 
1 Introduction 
Since the first quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol presented by Bennett 
and Brassard [1], many quantum cryptographic protocols, such as teleportation [2-7],  
quantum secret sharing (QSS) [8-16], quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) 
[17-21], and so on, have been proposed to solve various security problems. Recently, 
quantum private comparison (QPC) has become another popular topic for research. 
The goal of a QPC protocol is to privately compare two participants’ undisclosed 
information for equality. In previous QPC protocols, the participants need to be 
equipped with advanced quantum devices such as quantum memory, quantum 
generator, or quantum unitary operations for comparison.  
However, this paper proposes the first semi-quantum private comparison (SQPC) 
protocol for the participants who do not have any quantum capability to compare their 
secrets under an almost-dishonest third-party [22, 23]. An almost-dishonest TP may 
try to perform various possible attacks for disclosing the secret information of the 
participants, but he/she cannot collude with the participants.  
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In previous, Boyer et al. [24, 25] proposed two novel semi-quantum key 
distribution (SQKD) protocols using single photons. According to their definition, the 
term “semi-quantum” implies that the sender, Alice, is a powerful quantum 
communicant, whereas the receiver, Bob, has only classical capabilities. More 
precisely, the sender (Alice) has the ability to perform the following operations: (1) 
prepare any quantum state, such as single photons or Bell states, (2) perform any 
quantum measurement, such as Bell measurement or multi-qubit joint measurement, 
and (3) store qubits in a quantum memory. Conversely, the classical Bob is restricted 
to perform the following operations over the quantum channel: (1) prepare new qubits 
in the classical basis { 0 , 1 }  (i.e., Z basis), (2) measure qubits in the classical basis, 
(3) reorder the qubits via different delay lines, and (4) send or reflect the qubits 
without disturbance.  
As the classical basis only considers the qubits 0  and 1 , the other quantum 
superpositions of single photons are not assumed for the classical Bob. The classical 
Bob’s operations described above are equivalent to the traditional{0,1}computation. 
In this paper, we propose an SQPC protocol, where the classical participants are 
limited to perform the operations (1), (2), and (4). That is, the participants do not have 
any quantum capabilities, whereas the TP is the only one who has the quantum 
capability. A semi-quantum private comparison protocol can reduce not only the 
computational burden of the communicants but also the cost of the quantum hardware 
devices in practical implementations. Furthermore, the proposed protocols are free 
from various well-known attacks with the assumption of only an almost dishonest 
third party. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 proposes the 
semi-quantum private comparison (SQPC) protocol. Section 3 presents security   
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analyse of the proposed SQPC protocol. Section 4 summarizes our results. 
2 Proposed SQPC protocol 
This section proposes a new semi-quantum private comparison protocol under an 
almost-dishonest third party. Alice and Bob are two participants who want to compare 
the equality of their secret information in the SQPC protocol. TP is assumed to be an 
almost-dishonest third party who may try to derive information during executing of 
the protocol. TP may modify the procedure of the protocol to derive information, but 
he cannot publish a fake comparison result or collaborate with any client. The 
quantum channels are assumed to be ideal (i.e., non-lossy and noiseless), and the 
public channels between TP and Alice, TP and Bob, and Alice and Bob are also 
assumed to be authenticated. Based on the three-party scenario described above, the 
process of the proposed protocol will be described in steps as follows. 
2.1 Description of the proposed SQPC protocol 
Before presenting the steps of the proposed protocol, we briefly describe some 
rules for malicious behavior detection, some symbols, and entanglement swapping 
used in our protocol. In particular, for each received qubit, the participant has to set 
the values of 1I  and 2I  for that qubit, respectively. 1I =0/1 denotes that the participant 
selects the qubit for malicious behavior detection : 1I =0 indicates that the qubit is 
used to detect attacks from any malicious users, whereas 1I =1 is used to detect attacks 
from TP. 2I  indicates the type of operations performed on that qubit by the client. 
2I =0 represents that the participant performs the Z-basis measurement and 2I =1 
represents a direct reflection of the bit to TP by the client.  
The entanglement swapping allows one to measure on any two independent 
entangled photons, the rest photons will be entangled regardless of the distance 
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between them. For example, assume that there are two independent EPR    pairs, 
namely the pair 1-2 and the pair 3-4. Then if we perform Bell measurement on the 
qubit 1 and the qubit 3, then the qubit 2 and the qubit 4 which are originally 
independent will be entangled immediately. If the measurement result of the qubit 1 
and the qubit 3 is   , then the state of the qubit 2 and the qubit 4 must be    as 
well. We may encode the Bell measurement result in the classical bits as follows: 
00   , 01   , 10   , and 11   . The entanglement swapping follows 
the math formula 1 2 3 4Bell BellM q q M q q = 1 3 2 4Bell BellM q q M q q  [26, 27], where ⊕ is the 
exclusive-OR operation. In our scheme, TP will set a value of M according to this 
math formula. M=0 represents the measurement results and the math formula match, 
whereas M=1 represents the measurement results and the math formula do not match. 
Based on the coordination of the values of ( 1I , 2I ) and M, the proposed SQPC 
allows two mutually untrusted participants to compare the equality of their secrets 
under the almost dishonest TP. The detail of the protocol is described in steps as 
follows: 
Step1. TP randomly generates two sequences of Bell states 
1 2 3
{ , , ,..., }
nA A A A A
S S S S S ,
1 2 3
{ , , ,..., }
nB B B B B
S S S S S with the length of n, where 
1 2{ , }i
i i
AS a a , 1 2{ , }i
i i
BS b b  for i =1,2,…,n. The initial state of each pair in iAS  ( iBS ) 
is denoted as 
iA
IS  (
iB
IS ) (
iA
IS  and 
iB
IS { , , , }       ). Then, TP divides 
these two sequences AS  and BS  into four ordered sequences, 1 1{ }
iA a , 2 2{ }
iA a , 
1 1{ }
iB b and 2 2{ }
iB b  for i =1,2,…,n, which denote all the first and the second 
particles of Bell states in AS  and BS , respectively.  
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Step2. After the Step1’s preparation, TP retains the sequences 2A  and 2B , and  
sends a particle in the sequences 1A  to Alice and a particle in 1B  to Bob 
respectively.  
Step3. When Alice (Bob) receives a qubit 1
ia  ( 1
ib ) in 1A  ( 1B ), she (he) has to 
set the values of 1
iI  and 2
iI  for that qubit. If 1
iI =0, Alice (Bob) will send 1
iI  
and 2
iI  back to TP, whereas when 1
iI =1, Alice (Bob) will only send 1
iI  back to 
TP and keep 2
iI  in her (his) hand. TP will perform three different operations 
according to 1
iI  and 2
iI  as shown in Table1. In our scheme, if a participant wants to 
check Eve’s attack, he/she will set 1I =0. If a participant wants to check the honesty of 
TP, then he/she sets 1I =1. TP can only be checked when both participants want to do 
so, i.e., 1I =1 should be set by both clients for that qubit. If only one participant wants 
to check TP, then he/she will be ignored. The protocol can be described in the 
following three cases. 
Step4.   
Case1. If Alice (Bob) sets 1 0
iI   and 2
iI =0, then she (he) first sends the value of 
1
iI  and the measured qubit to TP. Because Alice (Bob) might change the state of the 
photon which comes from TP, we use 
*
1
ia  (
*
1
ib ) to denote the photon which Alice 
(Bob) sends back to TP. After TP receives 1
iI =0 and 
*
1
ia , he publicly announces an 
acknowledgment. When Alice (Bob) receives the acknowledgment, Alice (Bob) sends 
2
iI =0 and the measurement result 
1
ia
MR  (
1
ib
MR ) to TP. When TP receives the 
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measurement result 
1
ia
MR  (
1
ib
MR ) and 2
iI =0, TP performs a Z-basis measurement 
on 
*
1
ia  (
*
1
ib ) and obtains the measurement result *
1
ia
MR  ( *
1
ib
MR ). Then TP compares 
the measurement result 
1
ia
MR  (
1
ib
MR ) with the measurement result *
1
ia
MR  ( *
1
ib
MR ) to 
check the existence of an eavesdropper. If the measurement results are not equal, then 
TP will terminate the protocol and start from the beginning. If the measurement 
results are equal, then TP will follow the Step2 to send out the next qubits to the 
clients. 
Case2. If Alice (Bob) sets 1
iI =0 and 2
iI =1, then Alice (Bob) first sends the 
original qubit and 1
iI =0 to TP. After TP receives the qubit and 1
iI =0, he publicly 
announces an acknowledgment. After Alice (Bob) receives the acknowledgment, she 
(he) sends 2
iI =1 to TP. TP then performs a Bell measurement on the qubit 
*
1
ia 2
ia  
(
*
1
ib 2
ib ) and compares the Bell measurement result with the initial state of 
iA
S  (
iB
S ) 
to see whether they are equal or not. If the measurement results are not equal, then TP 
will terminate the protocol and start from the beginning. If the measurement results 
are equal, then TP will follow the Step2 to send out the next qubits to the clients. 
Case3. If Alice and Bob both set 1
iI =1, then they send the qubits and 1
iI =1 to TP. 
When TP receives both 1
iI =1 from Alice and Bob, TP performs two Bell 
measurements on the qubits 
*
1
ia *1
ib  and 2
ia 2
ib , which are denoted as 
* *
1 1
i i
BellM a b  and 
2 2
i i
BellM a b  respectively. Then TP sets a value for the variable M according to the math 
formula mentioned earlier (i.e.,  
i iA B
IS IS =
2 2
* *
1 1
i i i i
Bell BellM a b M a b ). 
M=1 if 
i iA B
IS IS  is not equal to 
2 2
* *
1 1
i i i i
Bell BellM a b M a b , whereas M=0 if 
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i iA B
IS IS  is equal to 
2 2
* *
1 1
i i i i
Bell BellM a b M a b . Then the protocol continues to the 
next step. 
Table 1.  
Alice Bob TP 
1I =0, 2I =0 1I =0, 2I =0 Z-basis measurement
*
1a ,
*
1b  
1I =0, 2I =0 1I =0, 2I =1 Z-basis measurement
*
1a  
Bell measurement(
*
1b , 2b ) 
1I =0, 2I =0 1I =1, 2I =0 Z-basis measurement
*
1a  
Ignore Bob 
1I =0, 2I =0 1I =1, 2I =1 Z-basis measurement
*
1a  
Ignore Bob 
1I =0, 2I =1 1I =0, 2I =0 Bell measurement (
*
1a , 2a ) 
Z-basis measurement
*
1b  
1I =0, 2I =1 1I =0, 2I =1 Bell measurement (
*
1a , 2a ) 
Bell measurement (
*
1b , 2b ) 
1I =0, 2I =1 1I =1, 2I =0 Bell measurement (
*
1a , 2a ) 
Ignore Bob 
1I =0, 2I =1 1I =1, 2I =1 Bell measurement (
*
1a , 2a ) 
Ignore Bob 
1I =1, 2I =0 1I =0, 2I =0 
Ignore Alice 
Z-basis measurement
*
1b  
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1I =1, 2I =0 1I =0, 2I =1 
Ignore Alice 
Bell measurement (
*
1b , 2b ) 
1I =1, 2I =0 1I =1, 2I =0 Bell measurement (
*
1a ,
*
1b ) 
Bell measurement ( 2a , 2b ) 
1I =1, 2I =0 1I =1, 2I =1 Bell measurement (
*
1a ,
*
1b ) 
Bell measurement ( 2a , 2b ) 
1I =1, 2I =1 1I =0, 2I =0 
Ignore Alice 
Z-basis measurement
*
1b  
1I =1, 2I =1 1I =0, 2I =1 
Ignore Alice 
Bell measurement (
*
1b , 2b ) 
1I =1, 2I =1 1I =1, 2I =0 Bell measurement (
*
1a ,
*
1b ) 
Bell measurement ( 2a , 2b ) 
1I =1, 2I =1 1I =1, 2I =1 Bell measurement (
*
1a ,
*
1b ) 
Bell measurement ( 2a , 2b ) 
 
Step5. If M = 0, TP has to send M and the Bell measurement result on the qubits 
*
1
ia *1
ib , i.e., 00   , 01   , 10   , or 11    to Alice and Bob. After 
Alice and Bob receive these M and the Bell measurement result, they will perform 
public discussion based on the values of 2
iI . If Alice and Bob both set 2
iI = 0 in 
Step3, then they have to send the Z-basis measurement result on that qubit (i.e., 
1
ia
MR  and 
1
ib
MR ) to each other via an authenticated channel. Then Alice and Bob 
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both compare 
1
ia
MR  and 
1
ib
MR  based on 
* *
1 1
i i
BellM a b . That is: if 
* *
1 1
i i
BellM a b 
 , 
then 
1
ia
MR  and 
1
ib
MR  must be either 0 , 0  or 1 , 1 . If 
* *
1 1
i i
BellM a b 
 , then 
1
ia
MR  and 
1
ib
MR  must be either 0 , 1  or 1 , 0 . If the measurement results do 
not match then it implies TP does not honestly follow the procedure of the protocol. 
Hence, Alice and Bob will terminate the protocol and start from the beginning. If the 
measurement results match, the protocol will go back to the Step2 for the next qubit. 
For the other cases, i.e., Alice and Bob both set 2
iI = 1 or one sets 2
iI = 1 and the 
other sets 2
iI = 0, then it implies either TP honestly follow the procedure of the 
protocol or the clients do not have enough information to check the honesty of TP. 
Hence, the protocol will go back to the Step2 for the next qubit. 
On the other hand, if M = 1, then TP has to send M to Alice and Bob. Hereafter, 
Alice and Bob will perform public discussion based on the value of 2
iI . If Alice and 
Bob both set 2
iI =1 in Step3, then it implies TP does not honestly follow the 
procedure of the protocol. Hence, they will terminate the protocol and start from the 
beginning. For the other cases, i.e., one client sets 2
iI = 1 and the other client sets 2
iI
= 0, then it implies that the clients do not have enough information to check the 
honesty of TP. The protocol will go back to the Step2 for the next qubit. Only when 
Alice and Bob both set 2
iI =0, the protocol will continue to the next step. 
Step6. Up to this step, we know that both Alice and Bob have set 1
iI = 1 and 2
iI = 
0 and have received M=1 from TP. In this step, Alice and Bob will use their 
measurement results to compare their secret messages. Let, 
A
iM  and 
B
iM  be the ith 
bit of secret messages of Alice and Bob respectively. Alice and Bob individually 
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compute 
1
i
A A
i i
a
R MR M  and
1
i
B B
i i
b
R MR M   and then send 
A
iR  and 
B
iR  to TP. 
Upon receiving 
A
iR and
B
iR , TP transforms the Bell measurement result 
*
1
ia *1
ib  into 
a classical bit string 
T
iC ( 0,  0,  1,  1          ) and calculates the 
comparison results 
A B T
i i i iR R R C   . If there is a bit ’1’ in R, then TP terminates 
the protocol, and publishes ’1’ indicating that Alice’s and Bob’s information is 
different. Otherwise, TP repeats the protocol from Step 2 to Step 6 until all the secret 
messages are compared. If there are all zeros in R, then TP announces that the two 
participants’ information are identical. 
3 Security analyses 
To analyze the security of the proposed protocol, this section is divided into two 
parts to focus on two different attacks (the outsider attack and the insider attack). The 
proposed protocol contains three insiders (i.e., an almost-dishonest third party, TP, and 
two participants: Alice and Bob). While Section 3.1 investigates the outside 
eavesdropper’s attack, Section 3.2 analyzes the possibility for an insider (i.e., TP or a 
participant) to obtain the other participant’s secret information. 
3.1 Outsider attack 
A malicious outsider, Eve, may try to perform some well-known attacks, such as 
the intercept-and resend attack [28] by intercepting the qubit sequences 1A  and 1B  
transmitted from TP to Alice and Bob respectively in Step2 and then measuring the 
qubits in the sequences. However, since Eve does not know the value of 
2
iI =0/1, if 
Eve measures on the transmitted sequences, she will be detected with a probability of 
7
1 ( )
8
n  in Step4, where n denotes the number of qubits in the sequences. If n is large 
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enough, the probability will be close to one. This is because: Alice (Bob) has 
1
2
 
probability to set 
1
iI =0 and 
1
2
 probability to set 
2
iI =1 and TP has 
1
2
 probability 
to get the different result from 
iA
IS  (
iB
IS ). Hence, Eve has 
7
8
 probability to pass 
the detection for each qubit. Hence, with n qubits, Eve will be detected with a 
probability of 
7
1 ( )
8
n  in Step4. For example: assume the initial state 
1
iA
S   
(
1
iB
S  ), Eve intercepts 
1
ia  (
1
ib ) and measures 
1
ia  (
1
ib ) with Z basis to get 0 , 
and sends 0  to Alice (Bob). Alice (Bob) sets 
1
iI =0 and 
2
iI =1 and sends the qubit 
*
1
ia  (
*
1
ib ) to TP. After TP receives 
*
1
ia  (
*
1
ib ) from Alice (Bob), Alice (Bob) sends 
2
iI  
to TP. Because 
1
iI =0 and 
2
iI =1, TP performs Bell measurement on 
*
1
ia 2
ia  (
*
1
ib 2
ib ). 
TP has a probability of 1
2
 to get the measurement result   . If TP gets the 
different result from 
iA
IS  (
iB
IS ), he/she knows that there is an eavesdropper.  
In some cases, Eve might intercept the qubit sequences 1A  and 1B  transmitted 
from TP to Alice and Bob respectively in Step2 and send the fake qubits to Alice and 
Bob. After Alice and Bob receive the fake qubits and set the values of 
1
iI  and 2
iI , 
they send the fake qubits to TP. Then Eve intercepts the fake qubits and resends the 
previous qubit sequences 1A  and 1B  to TP. However, since Eve does not know the 
value of 
2
iI (=0/1), if Eve sends the fake qubits to Alice and Bob, she will be detected 
with a probability of 
7
1 ( )
8
n  in Step4, where n denotes the number of qubits in the 
sequences. Since Alice (Bob) has 
1
2
 probability to set 
1
iI =0 and 
1
2
 probability to 
set 
2
iI =0 and TP has 
1
2
 probability to get the different result from 
*
1
i
zM a  (
*
1
i
zM b ) 
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and the measurement result which Alice (Bob) sends, Eve has 
7
8
 probability to pass 
the detection for each qubit. Hence, with n qubits, Eve will be detected with a 
probability of 
7
1 ( )
8
n  in Step4. For example: assume that the initial state 
1
iA
S   (
1
iB
S  ). Eve intercepts 
1
ia  (
1
ib ) and sends a fake qubit 0  to Alice 
(Bob). If Alice (Bob) sets 
1
iI =0 and 
2
iI =0, then Alice (Bob) performs Z-basis 
measurement on Eve’s qubit and sends 
*
1
ia  (
*
1
ib ) to TP. Eve intercepts 
*
1
ia  (
*
1
ib ) and 
resends 
1
ia  (
1
ib ) to TP. After TP receives 
1
ia  (
1
ib ) from Eve, Alice (Bob) sends 
2
iI  
and the measurement result of Eve’s qubit to TP. Because 
1
iI =0 and 
2
iI =0, TP 
performs Z-basis measurement on 
*
1
ia  (
*
1
ib ). Then TP has a probability of 1
2
 to get 
the measurement result 1 . If 
*
1
i
zM a  (
*
1
i
zM b ) is different from the measurement 
result which Alice (Bob) sends, then TP will detect the existence of an eavesdropper. 
Consequently, the outside attacker cannot get any useful information from the 
participants without being detected. 
3.2 Insider attack 
 In this sub-section, two cases of insider attacks are considered. The first case 
discusses the possibility for a participant to obtain the other participant’s secret 
information. The second case discusses the possibility for TP to retrieve the two 
participants’ secret information. 
Case 1 Participant attack 
Suppose Alice is a malicious participant who tries to reveal the other 
participant’s (Bob) secret information. If Alice tries to intercept the transmitted 
photons 
1
ib  from TP to Bob, she will be caught as an outside attacker as described in 
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Sect. 3.1. Because when Bob sets 
1
iI =0, Alice cannot involve in the discussion of TP 
and Bob. So if Alice wants to reveal Bob’s information 
B
iM , she will be detected by 
TP like an Eve and the detection rate is the same as described in Sect. 3.1. Similarly, if 
Bob tries to perform an attack on the protocol, he will be detected too.  
Case 2 TP attack 
Because TP is an almost-dishonest third party, he might not faithfully execute the 
procedure of the protocol, and try to reveal participant’s information. When 
1
iI =0, 
we detect either Eve’s attack or a participant’s attack with TP’s help. On the contrary 
we detect TP’s attack when Alice and Bob both set 
1
iI =1. If TP wants to reveal a 
participant’s secret information, he/she can generate fake initial states like Z-basis 
single photons instead of Bell state. When Alice and Bob measure the qubit with 
Z-basis and publish 
A
iR  and 
B
iR , TP can directly learn Alice’s and Bob’s secret 
information. However, in our proposed protocol, Alice and Bob have to discuss the 
entanglement of 
* *
1 1
i i
BellM a b  and 2 2
i i
BellM a b  in Step5. If TP generates Z-basis single 
photons, he does not know the entanglement of 
* *
1 1
i i
BellM a b  and 2 2
i i
BellM a b . Hence, he 
does not know how to set the value of M. TP will be detected in Step5 when 
participants both set 
1
iI =1 and 2
iI =1 and the detection rate is about 1-
15
( )
16
n
. If n is 
large enough, the probability will be close to one. This is because: Alice and Bob both 
have 
1
2
 probability to set 
1
iI =1 and 
1
2
 probability to set 
2
iI =1. Hence, TP has a 
probability of 
15
16
 to pass the detection for each qubit. Hence, with n qubits, Eve will 
be detected with a probability of 
15
1 ( )
16
n  in Step5. 
TP could generate two Bell states and performs Bell measurement on 
1
*ib
2
ib  
15 
 
instead on 
1
*ia
1
ib . Then TP compares the Bell measurement result with 
iB
IS . If the 
two results are different then it implies Bob sets 
1
iI =1 and 2
iI =0, TP will perform 
Z-basis measurement on 
*
1
ia  to reveal Alice’s secret information and set M=1. If the 
two results are the same, TP will set M=0. In this attack, however, if TP sets M=0, 
then TP does not know the Bell measurement result of 
1
*ia
1
*ib . TP will be detected in 
Step5 when participants both set 
1
iI =1 and 2
iI =0 and the detection rate is about 1-
31
( )
32
n
. If n is large enough, the probability will be close to one. This is because: Alice 
and Bob both have 
1
2
 probability to set 
1
iI =1 and 
1
2
 probability to set 
2
iI =0 and 
TP has 
1
2
 probability to send wrong Bell measurement result of 
1
*ia
1
*ib  to Alice and 
Bob. Hence, TP has a probability of 
31
32
 to pass the detection for each qubit. Hence, 
with n qubits, Eve will be detected with a probability of 
31
1 ( )
32
n  in Step5. 
In our protocol, only TP has the information about the initial state. Therefore he 
can reveal the comparison result of both participants, but TP cannot know the 
participants’ secret information. 
4 Conclusions 
This paper presents the first semi-quantum private comparison (SQPC) protocol 
under an almost-dishonest third-party. A semi-quantum private comparison protocol 
can reduce not only the computational burden of the communicants but also the cost 
of the quantum hardware devices in practical implementations. The security analysis 
shows that the proposed protocols are free from the outsider attack and the insider 
attack. It should also be noted that, like the other semi-quantum schemes, the 
proposed protocol also suffers from the Trojan-horse attacks [29-31]. To prevent this 
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kind of attacks, the photon number splitter device and wavelength filter device could 
be adopted [32, 33]. Throughout this paper, we have assumed an almost–dishonest TP. 
In the future, it could be very challenging to further reduce the trustworthy news of 
the TP to an individually dishonest as defined in [34], where TP cannot even publish 
a fake comparison result. 
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